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NLRB ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY
AND CERTAINTY
BERNARD SAMTOFF t
Statistics continue to show an increase in inconclusive NLRB
elections,1 an increase in the number of objections filed by employers,2
and an increase in the number of public reports on objections and
determinative challenges.' Whether one considers the figures alarming,
interesting, or expected, they raise questions about the usefulness of
elections for settling representation issues. Both the public and the
labor-management community prefer elections as the means for deciding
whether or not workers wish union representation. Indeed, the recent
celebration of the twenty-five-millionth voter was shared by influential
public and private leaders. Even the critics of the NLRB who condemn
the Board's reliance upon authorization cards to establish majority
relresentation extol the election process. In view of this apparent sup-
port, increased union and management dissatisfaction with elections
certainly warrants concern.
The utility of elections lies in final, definitive and unchallenged
results; elections become useless when the results are challenged, un-
certain, or rejected. Elections are intended to establish and stabilize
representation, not to leave it unsettled and in dispute.
This article focuses upon the functional aspect of NLRB elections,
namely, deciding questions of representation. My major thesis is that
definitive election results are needed to satisfy representational require-
ments. I seek to direct attention to the consequences of inconclusive
elections, and to present a viewpoint from which to look at the increas-
ing number of objections. There is here no exposition or analysis of
decisions, no discussion of free speech, and no criticism of campaign
tactics or electioneering. Primarily, I view the increasing number of in-
conclusive elections from the perspective of a participating adminis-
trator. For "data" I rely upon my quarter-century with the NLRB.
During this period I have been involved directly in investigating, re-
searching, and reporting some 550 cases of objections and challenges.
t Regional Director, NLRB Region Four (Philadelphia). The discussion, analy-
sis, and suggestions presented in this article do not represent the official views of the
NLRB, its General Counsel, or the author.
I See Table I in the Appendix, p. 253 infra.
2 See Table II in the Appendix, p. 253 infra.
3 See Table III in the Appendix, p. 253 infra.
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I cannot even estimate the number of decisions I have read, or calculate
my many discussions with General Counsels, NLRB members, other
colleagues, knowledgeable scholars, and practitioners. I shall also refer
to political theory and to behavioral and empirical studies of man as
a voter.
One significant function of an election is to choose an agent to
carry out the responsibilities of representation. For this to be accom-
plished, the process must lead to an undisputed result. The NLRB's
election process best serves this function if:
1. competing parties are uncertain about the impact upon voters
of campaign statements, speeches and literature, but are certain about
the finality of results: meaningful and acceptable choice exists only so
long as no party can control the voter's selection of his representative;
2. the voter is exposed to, and reacts to, a variety of concerns and
pressures from all sides;
3. the NLRB does not oversee the propaganda and conduct of the
parties but concentrates upon the results;
4. the goal of ideal conditions is eschewed, since it requires an
intricate network of procedures and regulations negativing definitive
results; and
5. every election unit has a regular and substantially uniform
election process.
If one accepts the enumerated conditions as a useful framework, it
should be possible to examine and analyze NLRB representation elec-
tions in order to determine whether the existing rules, standards, and
procedures 4 accomplish a desirable balance.
I. UNCERTAINTY-CERTAINTY PARADOX
Representation elections, first used by the War Labor Board in
World War I, and incorporated in the Railway Labor Act' and
4 Throughout this article, "rules," "standards," "procedures," and similar expres-
sions are used to refer to the NLRB's regulation of employer and union campaign
tactics that do not constitute unfair labor practices. Where the Board finds that sub-
stantial employer unfair labor practices occurred before an election lost by the union,
the Board will require the employer to bargain with the union if it can demonstrate
that a majority of workers signed authorization cards before the election. Irving Air
Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277
(1964). See generally Comment, Employer "Good Faith Donbt," 116 U. PA. L. REV.
709 (1968).
,545 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
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Wagner Act,6 were accepted as the legitimate means for determining
employee representation as part of a broader scheme to establish lawful
collective bargaining. The election is not an end in itself, but a means
for choosing or rejecting a union. To be meaningful, and to gain
acceptance from workers, unions, employers, and the public, election
results must be uncontrolled and uncontrollable. If the results can be
predetermined, then elections are not a choice but a rubber-stamp ap-
proval of a choice made elsewhere. Elections are the critical process
in a democratic system.'
Employers and unions should be uncertain about the particular
impact of statements, speeches, literature, and conversations upon work-
ers, but should be certain about the finality of election results. This
is the paradox and strength of the democratic process: unsure means
produce sure results. Elections are competitive, leading to a single
winner. However intense the competitive struggle, definitive results
are the functional requisite. Having participated in deliberately con-
trived and uncontrolled competition, losers must accept the results;
otherwise, elections fail to fulfill their function. Chaos would disrupt
our political system if twenty per cent of the losing candidates chal-
lenged the results of their elections, as do twenty per cent of the losers
in NLRB elections.
II. WORKER-VOTER AND CITIZEN-VOTER
The worker-voter is the same human being as the citizen-voter.
In NLRB elections, he is subject to the same kinds of internal and
external influences as in political elections. He is influenced by status,
role, residence, religion, race, national origin, and reference groups;
by relatives, fellow workers, and superiors; and by numerous incal-
culable and unperceived emotional and psychological pressures.
Those persons who support standards governing propaganda in
NLRB elections argue that since the employer has an inherent eco-
nomic advantage over the electorate, his propaganda will always be
considered in light of an assumption by employees that economic re-
prisals will follow a pro-union vote. One weakness of this argument
is that it does not differentiate the various possible balances of power
between employers and unions; but its principal underlying fallacy is
6 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 352, § 9, 49 Stat. 453. At present, the right
of an employer, union, or employee to petition the NLRB for a representation election
is guaranteed by National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 9(c),
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
7 Joseph A. Schumpeter defined the "democratic method" as "that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power
to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote." J. SCHUmPEmR,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed. 1962).
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the assumption that the proximate cause of the worker's choice is the
employer-employee relationship rather than some other factor or fac-
tors. We should be cautious about conceiving NLRB elections as
essentially different from political elections, because a comparison of
the evidence from political elections 8 and the data from a carefully
designed empirical study of voters in an NLRB election casts doubt
upon this assumption, and because several thoughtful scholars do not
see worker-voters as a unique electorate.
Professor Irving Brotslaw studied workers' attitudes in one
NLRB election where the Board had sustained the union's objections.
He concluded:
A majority of the respondents seemed to feel that the tactics
alleged to have been employed by the company as part of its
effort to defeat the union did not create a coercive atmosphere
which rendered impossible the holding of a fair election, even
though the union's charges to this effect [i.e., objections]
were later upheld by the NLRB. This raises the question of
whether employees subjected to pressures and counter-pres-
sures exerted by a union and/or company during a represen-
tation election fully perceive the effect upon voting behavior
attributable to the campaigns conducted by the respective
parties.9
Undoubtedly, the decision to vote for or against union
representation is the product of numerous factors, which are
not easily isolated for analytical purposes.' °
Perhaps Professor Brotslaw's most significant finding concerns rela-
tionships among the variables influencing a voter's choice:
[T]here did seem to be a positive association between the
union status of the respondents' father and/or close friends
and voting behavior. Similarly, those respondents with pre-
vious work experience (particularly those who had previously
worked in manufacturing establishments) and those who had
been union members on previous jobs, were more inclined to
vote in favor of union representation."
8 See, e.g., AmERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR (E. Burdick & J. Brodbeck eds. 1959);
B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFELD & W. MCPHEE, VOTING 277-323 (1954); A. CAMPBELL,
P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964); S. KELLY,
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING (1960) ; R. LANE, POLITICAL LIFE 46-52 (1959); P. LAZARS-
F., B. BERELSON, & H. GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE (2d ed. 1948); S. Lns-r,
POLITICAL MAN (1963).
9 Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LAB. L.J.
149, 170 (1967) (emphasis added). To my knowledge this is the only empirical study
that systematically explores and analyzes the factors bearing upon workers' choices in
an NLRB election.
10 Id. at 156.
i Id. at 169.
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Professor Derek Bok, in his masterful and comprehensive analysis
of campaign tactics in NLRB elections, appears to support the view
that worker-voters, like citizen-voters, react unpredictably to campaign
pressures. The effects of
[t]hreats and other appeals to fear and emotion [as well as]
the subtler aspects of a campaign-restrictions on distribu-
tion, inaccurate statements, interrogation by the employer,
and the like- . . . are . . . difficult to guage. s
Whether ofr not NLRB and political elections are analogous, as
I believe they are, it is indisputable that the influences of campaign
tactics upon both the worker-voter and the citizen-voter are unknown,
if not unknowable.
III. POLITICAL AND NLRB ELECTIONS
Generally, the Board differentiates between NLRB and political
elections, and conceives its role as insuring uninhibited choice by
employees.
A Board election is not identical with a political election.
[T] he Board not only conducts elections, but it also oversees
the propaganda activities of the participants in the election
to insure that the voters have the opportunity of exercising
a reasoned, untrammeled choice for or against labor organi-
zations seeking representation rights. 3
Because the Board treats worker-voters as a special kind of electorate
requiring insulation from certain kinds of propaganda, the Board must
subordinate the determinative results that are crucial in political
elections in order to guarantee laboratory conditions.
Aside from the question whether NLRB and political elections are
analogous,"4 their similarities bear upon the necessity of definitive re-
sults. The following can be identified as common features.
1. Human beings, belonging to a diverse but integrated society
and sharing similar experiences, vote in both.
2. The function of both elections is to select a representative; even
though the voters in NLRB elections may reject a union, they thereby
select the employer as their agent.
12 Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAgv. L. Rzv. 38, 41 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Bok].
13 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69 (1962).
14 With reference to "considerations of propriety" in political elections and NLRB
elections, Bok concludes, "It is hard to make out any general case for departing funda-
mentally from [our political] experience in administering the NLRA." Bok 56-57.
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3. Both types of election involve intense competition for the voters'
support.
4. In both, there are a variety of appeals, distortions, pressures,
inducements, and fears.
5. In both, voters seek to satisfy a variety of needs, wants, and
interests.
6. In both, neither the competitive parties, nor the candidates, nor
the voters know what is the proximate cause or reason for any specific
choice.
7. In both, truly rational choices are probably never achieved.
8. In both, accepted results are one means for arriving at the
stable, though temporary, consensus necessary for the operation of the
political or collective bargaining system.
Despite the numerous significant common features of political and
NLRB elections, the Board consistently departs from our experience in
political elections. The Board not only oversees the campaign activities
of all parties, but also seeks to establish ever higher standards to insure
workers a sober, reasoned, informed, and untrammeled choice. Accord-
ing to the Board, what misleads and misinforms workers and what
plays upon their feelings is neither fixed nor immutable, and must be
evaluated in each challenged election. Note the contrast with our
handling of electioneering in political campaigns, and the priority given
to political election results.
Of no apparent significance to the Board are the following facts:
1. The number of objections has doubled in a decade.
2. The four unions using NLRB election services most frequently
file a comparatively low percentage of objections.
3. A handful of unions are responsible for filing most objections.
4. There are no data showing any causal relationship between
campaign propaganda and election results."
15 Perhaps I should note one exception. In his statement to the Special Labor
Subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee on August 7, 1967,
William L. Kircher, Director of the Department of Organization of the AFL-CIO,
reported the results of an NLRB election study conducted by his staff. Using a sample
of 495 elections, the study shows that in the 94% where employers conducted anti-
union campaigns, unions won 52%, whereas in the 6% where there was no company
opposition unions won 28 out of 29, and tied the other. Kircher's conclusion from the
data is that since it is "very natural for workers to unionize," employers must create
an "essentially unnatural atmosphere" through propaganda and conduct to defeat unions.
Apart from my reservations regarding the objectivity of research designed and con-
ducted by AFL-CIO representatives, I don't believe that this study refutes the evidence
adduced by Professor Brotslaw, the conclusions of Professor Bok, and my own experi-
ences with objections. Unhappily, rigorous systematic studies of NLRB elections are
lacking.
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It is not surprising, therefore, that Professor Bok questioned the
validity of basing NLRB standards on the assumption that particular
propaganda or conduct has a substantial or probable tendency to affect
the worker's vote. Professor Benjamin Aaron has noted more criti-
cally that
the Board has indulged in some uncommonly silly and
completely unverified assumptions that various forms of
speech or conduct will or will not interfere with the employee's
free choice of a bargaining agent.:'
I submit that the similarities between NLRB and political elections
are significant in assessing the functional role of conclusive results.
Just as we do not try in political elections to determine what propa-
ganda is pertinent and what is not, the NLRB should not attempt to
establish standards governing electioneering. If NLRB elections are
to serve their function, the parties should be uncertain about the con-
sequences of their propaganda. They should have to use the broadest
appeals, never sure of the worker's preference. Since the worker-voter
and the citizen-voter are the same human being, the prospect of condi-
tioning his NLRB choice is as unlikely as the probability of deter-
mining his political vote. But the Board, believing its duty is to insure
a valid choice by workers, aims for ideal election conditions and thereby
tends to subordinate the conclusiveness of results.
IV. THE NLRB's ROLE AS OVERSEER OF ELECTIONS
In its self-determined role as overseer, the Board seeks "to pro-
vide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibted
desires of the employees." " The Board is concerned with rationality,
fairness, and equality, not with results. But can any elections be con-
ducted under antiseptic conditions? Can they be germ-free? Or must
campaigns be filled with swirling eddies of propaganda, disingenuous
threats and promises, feelings, ideologies and rhetorical bombast? Isn't
it fatuous to expect employers and unions to rely solely upon sober
and reasonable arguments and upon facts accurately stated? Can the
Board establish workable standards for electioneering in diverse geo-
graphic and industrial settings without risking more and more disputed
results? I submit that the Board has set itself an unattainable goal
in assuming the role of overseer.
'
6 Aaron, Labor Relations Law, in CHALLENGES TO CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 113,
128 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
17 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
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In the Board's view, the true purpose of its elections is not neces-
sarily to reach undisputed results, but rather to create an atmosphere
in which the "surrounding conditions enable employees to register a
free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representa-
tive." 18 Election results are unacceptable to the Board, whatever the
margin of victory, if propaganda or conduct so tainted the atmosphere
that there could be no uninhibited, sober, and informed vote to reveal
the workers' true choice. By making the surrounding conditions the
touchstone for validating or invalidating results, the Board has made
a choice between impermissible electioneering and finality.
I have deliberately polarized the issue, even though the Board
has attempted to discriminate between various types of electioneer-
ing.19 Apparently the Board considers certainty less important than
ideal campaign conditions, for the Board seems unaffected by the
rising number of objections that result in part from the largely un-
successful effort to establish fair election standards. Even without
regard for the validity of theories about the effect of electioneering,
the fact of increased objections is one worthy of attention.
I suspect that the Board has based its election controls on a
self-fulfilling prophecy about employees.20 The Board, employers, and
unions assume that workers are generally like amoebas-unthinking,
unfeeling, passive, and reactive-easily swayed, unable to evaluate,
and susceptible to propaganda, promises, and blandishments.2 The
Board, employers, and unions seem to reject the view that workers
are generally reasonable, capable of acting in their own interests, and
open to change.' Hence, when workers reject a union, agents
attribute the loss to threats, promises, and distortions by the
employer, which manipulated the votes of the passive and easily
swayed workers. Further, the union agents assert that because of
the employer's superior economic power, both his message and his
Is Id. at 126.
19 See, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); Gummed Prods.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955).
20 Our view of the future, by affecting our present anxieties, thoughts and action
affects the future itself, since it is determined in part by what we believe it is going
to be. A self-fulfilling prophecy is one that, although false at the time it is pronounced,
influences behavior to such an extent that the prophecy comes to pass. The prophecy
fulfills itself by virtue of its pronouncement. Both unions and employers believe that
workers would support or reject representation, respectively, if the other party's false,
threatening and deceptive propaganda was refuted. Acting on this belief, each utilizes
propanganda on the basis of a false prophecy, and believes that whatever the results,
they came about by virtue of one party's electioneering behavior. See R. MERTON,
SociAL THEORY AND SOCIl STRucrua 421-26 (rev. ed. 1957).
21 "[L] egal rules will never succeed in making voters more rational than they are
willing and able to become." Bok 48.
22 "Personality is less a finished product than a transitive process. While it has
some stable features, it is at the same time continually undergoing change." G. ALL-
PoRT, BECOmING 19 (1960).
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means of dissemination prevented workers from making a free, true,
and natural choice, that is, voting for the union. This argument
that the employees would have voted for the union but for the em-
ployer's economic power is based on the questionable premise that
"[p]ower can persuade and substantial power can persuade sub-
stantially." 23
Yet no one has explained the impact of electioneering upon
whatever minority of voters supported the union. If the Board sets
aside an election because the workers rejected the union as a result
of impermissible employer propaganda, the necessary implication is
that some unknown portion of the majority would have voted for
the union but for the unlawful electioneering. On the other hand,
the minority voting for the union were not sufficiently influenced by
the employer's propaganda to vote against the union.' By examining
the statistics, we cannot discover the identity and characteristics of
the workers who were or were not affected. Hence, the Board can
only look to the propaganda to deduce in some mysterious manner
that the free choice of a critical number of unknown workers was
influenced. Should the self-fulfilled prophecy that employees can
be prejudicially influenced be transmuted into a controlling ule over-
riding election results?
Employers, like unions, are captive to the self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is unthinkable to employers that rational, free, and self-directed
workers would ever pick a collective agent in place of individual
bargaining. Hence, employers believe that but for union propaganda
their employees would naturally reject unions. To employers, a
union majority is solely the result of union threats, misrepresenta-
tions, exaggerations, or downright lies cleverly conveyed to unknow-
ing, unthinking and undiscriminating workers. The prophecy is ful-
filled whenever workers pick a union.
Piously asserting that the pre-election atmosphere must be tin-
polluted and uninhibiting, employers are increasingly filing objections.
2 3 Thomas Prods. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 21-810,
at 28,582 (Oct. 12, 1967). This twist of Lord Acton's famous maxim ignores consider-
able scholarship that suggests the concept of power be considered in terms of counter-
vailing power, net power, and power relationships. Power is not "[g]old bullion-
physically piled on someone's desk, infinitely fungible unit for unit, and indifferently
expendable to achieve any result." Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Free-
dom, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 38, 44 (1960). "Power in America seems . . . situational
and mercurial; it resists attempts to locate it in the way a molecule, under the Heisen-
berg principle, resists attempts simultaneously to locate it and time its velocity."
D. RIESMAN, N. GLAzER & R. DENNEY, THE LONELY CROWD 257 (1955).
24 "Men with power to affect the economic life-chances of a large group may
exert little interpersonal influence in other spheres: the power to withhold jobs from
people may not result in directly influencing their political or associational or religions
behavior." Merton, Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influence and of
Communications Behavior in a Local Community in CommuNICATiONS RESEARCH:
1948-1949, at 217 (P. Lazarsfeld & F. Stanton eds. 1949).
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But by refusing to accept an adverse vote, employers, like unions,
are showing a lack of concern for finality. This is hardly fair. Both
employers and unions are obviously concerned with final election
results, namely, those in their own interest. Only the Board, not
employers or unions, is really interested in overseeing propaganda. Yet
all appear to rely upon the self-fulfilling prophecy of undue influence.
There is one significant difference between employers and unions
regarding the outcome of balloting. Unlike unions, employers can post-
pone the certainty of elections not only by filing objections but also by
resisting bargaining. Further, their successful overall record in the
courts probably encourages employers to disobey bargaining orders
in situations where their objections have been overruled.'
More specifically, there is a variety of possible reasons why
employers are filing more objections. Perhaps they have learned the
advantages of disputing results, particularly when the union's margin
of victory is small. 6 The following list of possible causes, though
not exhaustive, should help to explain the increase in employer ob-
jections.
1. Where the union's majority is thin, the time required to
process objections may erode union support.
2. When employer objections are filed, the union must divert
its resources to defend the legality of the election instead of using
them to build its organization.
3. Objections delay bargaining and to that extent save the
employer bargaining expenses and the cost of possible increased em-
ployee benefits.
4. An enlarged complex of rules governing election propaganda
provides more opportunities for employer objections, and more knowl-
edgeable employer attorneys, many of whom are former NLRB
employees, provide the capability to take advantage of objection op-
portunities.
5. After objections are filed, the probability of success increases
as the employer moves from the investigations to the hearing, to the
Board, and eventually to the courts.
6. Even if the employer's objections are overruled and he ex-
hausts all avenues of review, he has a chance of inducing the union
:-5See, e.g., NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 917 (1967), deying enf. to 157 N.L.R.B. 1 (1966).26 Although the Board almost never adverts to the margin of victory as a factor
in deciding objections, I suspect that it is a latent element; certainly, the Board, courts,
and regional directors are aware of the results of the election.
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to withdraw because it has lost the employees' support, and at least
one chance in three of changing the initial results.
7. By filing objections the employer acquires a legitimate forum
for dramatically exposing the union's alleged misconduct, misrep-
resentation, and chicanery.
Every NLRB and court decision provides new grounds for filing
employer objections. Whether the union's electioneering is upheld
or disallowed, employers can ingeniously exploit the facts and argu-
ments in the opinion. If the enumerated reasons for employer ob-
jections are valid, then the Board's concentration upon laboratory
conditions and relative unconcern about conclusive results will surely
produce more and more objections.
The point here is that the Board's self-conceived role as over-
seer in NLRB elections needs critical reexamination. Elections can-
not be conducted under ideal conditions. Whatever the workers' true
choice may be as an abstract proposition, the human characteristics
of the voters and the competitive union-employer struggle cast serious
doubt on the likelihood of establishing workable election standards.
Moreover, the underlying support for devising usable criteria stems
from unthinking adherence to self-fulfilling prophecies, which prob-
ably in part explains the rising number of objections. Finally, the
Board's role as overseer also seems to contribute to the increased
number of employer objections, a consequence clearly dysfunctional
to the election process. What is called for is a shift from concern
with electioneering to an emphasis on certainty of results.
V. THE COSTS OF INCONCLUSIVE ELECTIONS
The direct and indirect costs of inconclusive elections to the
Board and the parties must be measured against the savings of con-
clusive elections. Although my colleagues may not share many of
the views expressed in this paper, they are virtually united in their
opposition to expending funds for handling objections. Maybe our
administrative (bureaucratic?) skirts are showing, but somehow we
feel that once the tally of ballots is handed to the parties the election
should be over.
NLRB costs are incurred for investigations, hearings, tran-
scripts, correspondence and reports, among other things. These
represent an investment that could otherwise be devoted to activities
27 This probability is inferred and extrapolated from two studies of rerun elec-
tions: Drotning, NLRB Remedies for Election Misconduct: An Analysis of Election
Outcomes and Their Determinants, 40 U. CHI. J. Bus. 137 (1967) ; Pollitt, NLRB
Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C. L. REv. 209 (1963). In the Pollitt study, em-
ployer and union objections were mixed, whereas in the Drotning study, only cases
involving union-filed objections were considered.
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more likely to improve the quality and efficiency of NLRB output.
Some may argue that if the aim of achieving fair elections is worth-
while, then any expenditure to secure this aim is warranted. But since
rational administrators must always balance finite resources against
infinite demands for allocation, and since every citizen wants the
Board to spend its money wisely and effectively, this contention
hardly meets the issue.
The NLRB has indicated that the gains achieved through its
role as overseer outweigh the costs.28 Apparently, the party disput-
ing the results prefers his costs to an adverse result. Yet I wonder
whether unions or employers calculate the costs in terms of workers'
productivity, diversion of managerial and union energies, and legal
and administrative services. All parties, including the NLRB, should
heed Professor Bok's perceptive comments:
The inconvenience and administrative costs that result
from a complex regulatory system are factors to be consid-
ered in deciding whether rules of more doubtful significance
should be imposed. Moreover, in view of the problems aris-
ing from the heavy workload of the Board, administrative
costs should have a bearing on the form in which rules are
cast and, more important still, on the creation of effective
sanctions for these rules.2 9
I do not suggest that costs must be the decisive consideration,
but I do suggest that they must be weighed in evaluating NLRB rules
governing elections. Because "a complex regulatory system" raises
costs, each new NLRB election rule must meet the test of prudent
allocation of resources. The NLRB's preoccupation with laboratory
conditions produces more disputed elections and increased costs.30 A
shift from concern about campaign tactics to concern about results
would remove many grounds for invalidating elections; a reduction
in the number of objections would lower expenditures for the Board,
unions, and employers. The Board could shift its energies to devis-
ing procedural rules that would provide employers and unions equal
opportunities to persuade workers. There can be no fruitful ap-
praisal of existing rules unless their costs are compared with the costs
of an alternative regulatory system.
2 8 In a case involving both objections and unfair labor practices the Board said:
. considerations of economy, in our view, must be subordinated to the overriding
policies of the Act." Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1281 (1964).
29 Bok 66.
30 The increase in costs can be illustrated by a recent case, in which four years of
investigation and litigation were required to determine the impact on laboratory con-
ditions of a rumor that the employer would fire all Negro employees if the union lost
the election. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 278 (1964), remanded, 357 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1966), aff'd, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 22,448 (May 13,
1968).
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VI. STANDARD ELECTION RULES
The establishment of definitive election results would help the
Board achieve standardized election rules. As a national agency, the
Board must formulate rules of decision to govern elections through-
out the country. Few would contend that propaganda directed at
workers in a highly-unionized community with some degree of so-
phistication in labor matters and good job opportunities has the same
impact as propaganda in an isolated, antiunion community with high
unemployment. Since NLRB standards for judging propaganda
must be applied nondiscriminatorily across the country, they cannot
vary to suit the sharply contrasting communities of this country.
In attempting to meet its federal responsibilities, the Board has vacil-
lated between the following approaches: (1) it has tried to generalize
election rules to the degree necessary to fit all kinds of propaganda;
and (2) it has evolved complex rules to cover every unique situation."'
An examination of NLRB decisions documents the above shifts,
and suggests that continued subordination of conclusive results is
likely to produce a more intricate network of rules. Analysis of one
well settled NLRB rule should illustrate and sharpen the issue. The
Board holds that an employer's threat to shut the plant if the union
wins is sufficient grounds on which to set aside the election should
the union lose. Sophisticated employers are counseled to avoid, such
crass threats. Instead, workers are told about the shutdown of a
nearby unionized plant. The causal connection between unionization
and plant shutdown is not articulated, but there can be no doubt that
the workers get the message. No one could catalogue the number
of variations on this theme. Depending on the employer's language,
the Board will either sustain or overrule objections. On first impres-
sion, it might appear that the Board has formulated a uniform na-
tional standard. But in application, the standard has many variations.
In fairness to employers, I should use an illustration involving
unions. Generally, union agents may not threaten or intimidate work-
ers directly during the pre-election period. But threats made by rank-
and-file employees-unsponsored, unheard, and unratified by the union
-can be circulated without necessarily invalidating the election re-
sults. Pro-union employees can and do tell workers that if the union
wins and they didn't support it, the union will get them fired. 2  The
voters get the message. Are such rank-and-filers the proper medium?
NLRB decisions and administrative experience make it clear that
employers and unions painstakingly peruse each decision and then
3'1 Dubin, Prospects of Industrial Conflict-A Prediction, in INwusRxL&L CON-
FLICr 529 (A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A. Ross eds. 1954).
32 Some unions also rely upon planted rumors for support. Bok 87 n.132.
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modify their electioneering strategies with the dual aim of exploiting
favorable propaganda and avoiding NLRB invalidation of desired
results. It appears that the parties are playing a costly charade, prin-
cipally because the Board affords them standards against which to
measure campaign tactics.
It is well to remember that this type of maneuvering is inherent
in elections, and the Board recognizes this. But the Board is over-
burdened with establishing and implementing some form of ideal
conditions. Since it cannot consistently maintain national uniformity,
the Board is pushed ineluctably toward myriad rules covering every
idiosyncratic situation.a A complex regulatory system should be
avoided. Conclusive results are crucial to the election process, and
the NLRB is more likely to achieve workable national standards if
it concentrates upon results rather than electioneering.
The One-Year Election Bar
Up to this point I have discussed and analyzed the NLRB's
treatment of objections to elections in the framework of the election
process. The background for the discussion has been the marked
increase in objections, and I have indicated that these would be re-
duced if the Board focused on making election results conclusive. To
round out our consideration, I will identify and review a statutory
provision that is probably a significant cause for increased union
objections. I believe that unions would file fewer objections if the
one-year election bar of section 9(c) (3) ' were deleted from the
statute.
In substance, section 9(c) (3) permits only one valid election
each year in any bargaining unit or subdivision. The object of this
provision is to prevent employers from being subjected to repeated
elections with their attendant costs, harassments, and propaganda.
Section 9(c) (3) does not foreclose perpetual organizing, but it does
33 There is a longstanding debate between those favoring NLRB substantive rules
and those supporting a case-by-case approach. In elections, the Board uses the latter
approach for developing substantive guides, which are applied in subsequent cases.
Whether the Board's exercise of its rule-making power would undesirably limit adapta-
tion to new situations is not the question here. I only suggest that the Board's present
course of developing decisional guides to achieve laboratory conditions produces many
nonuniform rules. I consider this complex regulatory system an unwanted and un-
productive consequence of the disregard for conclusiveness. Professor Peck has con-
cluded that the ". . . NLRB's exclusive reliance upon an ad hoc approach . . .has
produced grossly unsatisfactory results," Peck, Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 761 (1961), and that "the
Board's insistence on proceeding only by adjudication has deprived us of the clarifica-
tion and certainty that might be obtained through rule-making." Peck, A Critique of
the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudica-
timo and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. Ray. 254, 270 (1968).
34NLRA § 9(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1964).
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preclude certification within one year of a valid election that the union
loses.
In some situations the union cannot walk away despite adverse
election results. It may have to continue activities because the em-
ployer is competing with unionized firms. Or it may want to maintain
a cohesive nucleus to protect its employee supporters from employer
reprisals. Whatever the reasons, some union organizations persist
even after unfavorable election results.
If unions were allowed by statute to seek a second election within
one year, the number of their objections would diminish. Presently,
some unions exploit objections to keep their organizations viable, as
well as to invalidate the lost election and obtain a rerun. Prior to the
Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB conducted new elections irrespective of
the elapsed time on the condition that the union furnish a number of
fresh authorization cards larger than the number of votes it had re-
ceived. Although few reruns were conducted under the Wagner Act
within one year of an unsuccessful election, unions could at least try
again, provided they met the necessary conditions. I suspect that
this opportunity tended to inhibit some unions from filing objections.
I think it fair to say that section 9(c) (3) and section
8(b) (7) (C) tend to restrict unions from obtaining certifications
through elections. An unwanted and generally unnoticed consequence
is more union objections. One way to reduce such objections would
be to remove the one-year election bar and return to the practice fol-
lowed under the Wagner Act. Since the earlier arrangement worked
and yielded fewer objections, the one-year election bar deserves ex-
cision. Allowing reruns within a year under certain conditions and
providing for conclusive election results would benefit the public,
unions, and employers, because diminution of objections facilitates
the functioning of the election process.
Determinative Challenges
Although the increase in determinative challenges to ballots from
4.4 per cent to 6.6 per cent is not of the same magnitude as the in-
crease in objections, determinative challenges also postpone definitive
results. Thus, if the election process is to meet its functional requi-
3 NLRA § 8(b) (7) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (1964). Section 8(b) (7) (C)
provides that primary union picketing for an organizational or recognitional object may
be enjoined unless a petition is filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
30 days from the beginning of such picketing. One popular employer stratagem is to
file a petition in the hope that the union will lose the election and thus be foreclosed
for one year from obtaining certification. Organizational and recognitional picketing
is generally confined to market-oriented unions. But section 8(b) (7) (C) may provoke
such unions to file objections, and in fact, 3 out of the 4 unions filing most objections
fall into this category. Samoff, Recognition and Organizational Picketing-A Wider
Angle of Vision, 14 LAB. L.J. 891 (1963).
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sites, suitable means must be found for reducing, if not eliminating,
such challenges. With the dual aim of achieving certainty in elec-
tions and satisfying due process, I recommend a procedure that should
substantially reduce determinative challenges.
Under current practice, the Board agent tries to resolve chal-
lenges to ballots before the unchallenged ballots are tallied. If au-
thorized representatives are present, if they are prepared to resolve
challenges, and if the relevant information is available, the agent's
task is easy. Agents are encouraged to resolve challenges before the
votes are counted, and many challenges are disposed of by agreement
of the parties at that time. However, for various reasons and in
diverse circumstances the challenges are unresolved.
How should we handle challenges where the parties will not
agree to resolve them before the votes are counted? Analogizing from
political elections, I propose that the Board authorize NLRB agents
to decide challenges despite any lack of agreement. It is crucial to
dispose of challenges before the votes are counted. Once the unchal-
lenged ballots are tabulated and unopened challenges become deter-
minative, the parties harden their positions. They estimate the prob-
able choice in each challenged ballot and devise strategies intended
to achieve favorable disposition according to their predictions. More-
over, workers who cast the challenged votes may be harassed and
pressured by unions or employers, and must become involved in the
NLRB investigation. If challenged ballots are eventually opened and
counted, the choices of the particular voters are no longer secret.
Under my proposal, NLRB agents would determine the validity
of the challenged ballots before the count. In these situations, early
availability of the list of eligibile voters required by the Excelsior
rule38 would obviously be valuable. Lacking agreement of the par-
ties, agents would consider the facts and contentions on each side,
and determine which challenged votes to count and which to leave
uncounted. Ballots found valid would be opened and commingled
with the unchallenged votes, and all of them would be tallied. If the
challenged votes remaining unopened were still determinative, the
usual investigation and report would be made. If any party were
dissatisfied with the agent's ruling on challenges, it could file objec-
tions. But the proposal would not add to the number of objections
because agents would generally make sensible rulings that most parties
would accept. If the number of determinative challenges were re-
duced, results would become more conclusive.
36Under this rule, which is observed by most employers, unions must be given
lists of the names and addresses of eligible voters at least 10 days before an election.
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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With advance knowledge of the agent's authority to resolve
challenged ballots, the parties would come to the ballot count prepared
to review questions of eligibility. Entrusted with this authority and
encouraged to exercise it, NLRB agents would be better prepared to
handle disputed ballots. It is rare in political elections for candidates
or parties to dispute a judge's disposition of questioned ballots. I
anticipate similar consequences in NLRB elections under my proposal.
Most important, results would be made more conclusive.
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND EMERGING THEMES
The major point of this paper is simple. As shown in the Ap-
pendix, during the steady increase in NLRB elections since 1958, the
percentage of objections has more than doubled. Whatever the causes
for this substantial increase, it is certain that inconclusive elections
are dysfunctional to a system for resolving representation questions
as the foundation for collective bargaining. The magnitude of un-
settled and unstabilizing elections (19.4 per cent) has reached an
alarming level.
These statistics are not disquieting to those who believe that in-
sulating workers from improper influences is the highest goal of the
system. When one is faced with obvious appeals to racism, thinly
veiled threats, a movie like And Women Must Weep cleverly con-
trived "to paint a fearful picture of what could happen to employees
if they voted . . . for union representation," 17 or gross exaggerations
of union benefits at other plants, a sense of outrage impels one toward
a finding of illegality. I have wrestled frequently with such situa-
tions and know the difficulties of deciding in a particular case whether
the campaign tactics did or did not interfere with the employees' free
choice.
But the statistics cannot be lightly brushed aside. Rules intended
to enforce higher election standards are unable to create laboratory
conditions by eliminating objectionable influences. Such rules are
irrelevant to the election process and detract from the finality of
election results. Moreover, election rules require "various assump-
tions of doubtful validity," and "assertions about the effects of cam-
paign itactics that . . . are controversial since election behavior is too
ambiguous to embrace [the] generalizations" 8 explicit in such rules.
Those who believe that the highest goal of elections is to register
the workers' true choice endorse the present ad hoc guidelines intended
to provide laboratory conditions, and believe that there is a reason-
37 Plochman & Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1962).
38 Bok 45.
[Vol.l17:228
NLRB ELECTIONS
able balance between permissible and impermissible campaign tactics.
Presumably, they do not share Professor Aaron's view that the
Board's commendable desire to preserve the uncorruptability
of the election process has led it to pursue, indefatigably and
hopelessly, the goal first enunciated in General Shoe.
or the judgment of Professor Bok that
[t]he conclusion that emerges . . . is simply that [flagrant
employer intimidation] will be far less frequent than one
might believe if one were to assume that employees are nor-
mally willing and able to reach rational conclusions in the
general run of elections.'
It appears to me that if the Board continues along the same road
there are bound to be more and more disputed elections. The Board's
capacity for finding propaganda and conduct sufficient to upset elec-
tions will be matched by the parties' ingenuity in finding new grounds
for filing objections. At some level of objections, elections will cease
to fulfill their functions. I believe the warning signals are clear, and
there is need for change.'
After more than three decades of overseeing campaign tactics,
the Board's attempts to remove various influences that may impinge
on voters do not seem effective. Indeed, Professor Aaron charac-
terizes this task as hopeless.' Professor Bok, in an article relying
in part upon materials from political science and social psychology,
which must be read to understand the dimensions of this subject,
concludes:
Rules which purport to put parties on a more equal footing
or to permit more rational decisions by the voters are likely
to have a more speculative value than one might suppose on
first impression. The decision whether to support a union is
too often inescapably nonrational, the effects of campaign
tactics on the employees too problematical, and the positions
of the parties too difficult to compare to permit the adminis-
trator to intervene with any real confidence of furthering his
objectives except in a limited range of situations.43
Professor Bok's judgment is supported by any fair analysis of
the data, and is reinforced by the form and function of the election
process. Since elections are a competitive struggle for the employees'
votes, the parties should be uncertain about the effect of campaign
39 Aaron, supra note 13, at 128 (emphasis added).
4OBok 53.
41 The first step in reassessing election controls should be to expand our limited
empirical knowledge of relationships among factors in the election process.
42 See text at note 35 supra.
43 Bok 65.
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tactics upon the voters' preference. At the same time, the process
must end with undisputed results if the chosen representative is to
play its legitimate role. Since the worker-voter and citizen-voter
are the same human being, and since NLRB and political elections are
functionally analogous, the voter in NLRB elections should be treated
as capable of making a reasonable and self-interested choice.
If this article accurately portrays the election process, then the
Board cannot effectively fulfill its role as overseer. Campaign tactics
are unlikely ever to satisfy the requirement of laboratory conditions.
Not only has the Board been ineffective in enforcing higher standards,
in view of the increase in objections, but higher standards have con-
tributed to rising costs. In attempting to formulate and implement
uniform national standards, the Board has shifted from generality to
myriad particular rules. But whether the standards are general or
particular, the objections increase, at least partly as a result of the
one-year election bar and the present procedure for handling chal-
lenges.
There are those who believe that only antiunion campaign tactics
by employers are responsible for the substantial rejection of unions.
But the unions may have had a higher percentage of victories prior
to 1958 because the Board had fewer rules governing elections, fewer
objections were filed, and the employers' antiunion electioneering was
less sophisticated. The decline in union successes may be a result of
increased opposition to unions by either employers or workers. And
whatever the explanation, more NLRB rules governing elections have
not reversed the trend.
One significant aspect of NLRB elections is that ninety per cent
or more of the eligible voters consistently vote. Workers with such
strong interest in election results are more likely to know the issues
and less likely to be susceptible to propaganda than apathetic voters.
Unlike political parties, which are interested only in getting their
supporters to the polls, both unions and employers strive for maximum
turnout in the belief that the result should be legitimized by the largest
number of voters. Direct involvement, familiarity with the issues,
appraisal of the propaganda, and maximum turnout could be the sys-
tem's corrective for electioneering, exaggerations, and misrepresenta-
tions.
Serious questions have been raised about the Board's regulations
controlling elections. Three contrasting approaches may be identified.
First, the purists want the Board to invalidate even more elections
and to evolve sanctions to deter parties from unlawful electioneering.
Second, the balancers agree generally with the Board's efforts to dif-
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ferentiate tolerable and intolerable campaign tactics. Third, the
equalitarians doubt whether the Board can promote a more rational
choice or maintain minimum standards of propriety in elections. The
equalitarians concentrate upon providing equal opportunities for all
parties to persuade the employees, and upon establishing the finality
of results. Obviously, I support the third approach.
The purists respond to more objections with more regulations
governing elections. As more rerun elections are held, more and
tougher sanctions are evolved. At some point, presumably, the par-
ties will see the light and cease their disallowed electioneering so that
workers can express their true choice. The assumption may be that
at this point objections will vanish.
The approach of the purists reflects an unwarranted confidence
in the capacity of law. The approach is also based on dubious as-
sumptions, faulty reasoning, and conclusions not only unproved but
invalid. It is well to remember that elections are held for the em-
ployees, not the parties. Because employees are not naturally for or
against unions, and because unions and employers usually are, only
the finality of the majority choice can cut off the contentions of the
parties and make elections useful in our representation system. Given
these features, the purists' position is neither tenable nor feasible.
With regard to the second approach, the conclusions of Pro-
fessors Aaron, Bok, and Brotslaw, the studies of voting behavior by
political scientists and social psychologists, and administrative expe-
rience in handling elections cast serious doubts on the NLRB's ca-
pacity to develop a balanced, enforceable set of regulations, and
implement them without unreasonable expenditure of time and money.
The stark fact of more and more inconclusive elections remains.
However appealing the approach of the balancers, the various inter-
ests cannot be accommodated under a regulating scheme if finality of
results is crucial. It is not sound public policy to attempt to control
the uncontrollable.44
VIII. AcCESS TO VOTERS
Over the decades, the Board has established rules governing
access to voters. Although Professor Bok finds many to be "of de-
batable importance." 45 I believe that rules affording parties equal
4 4 Commenting upon the Board's treatment of wage increases before elections,
Professor Bok wrote, "By not-considering [the purpose of a rule and the efficacy of its
sanction] administrators run the risk of maintaining a rule of speculative value which
cannot be adequately enforced, thus encouraging cynicism toward the law that is
already too prevalent in this field." Bok 116.
45 Id. at 103.
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opportunities to persuade workers are the only sound alternative, since
the Board can neither ensure rational choice nor maintain standards
of electioneering conduct. Communications are the core of every
campaign. There is a steady stream of leaflets, letters, speeches, con-
ferences, and conversations seeking to affect the worker's choice. The
voter probably obtains most of his information from partisan mes-
sages. Although we do not know whether the information is really
influential, at least the parties think it is. Further, our democratic
tradition and political experience support equal access to voters by
the competing parties.
My difference with the Board is not over its rules guaranteeing
all sides reasonable opportunity to convey their views to voters.
Rather, I oppose its unwillingness to rely on equal access as the basis
for rejecting objections to the content of communications. I sug-
gest concentration upon conclusive results as long as equal opportu-
nities are available.
The Board has taken some steps in equalizing access. It now
requires employers to furnish petitioning unions a list of the names
and addresses of employees in the unit at least ten days before an
election.46 With rare exceptions, employers furnish these lists. Fail-
ure to supply them in time is a basis for setting aside an election.
Although the high level of compliance may stem from the Board's
sanction, and from support by the courts, I have heard many em-
ployers and their attorneys endorse the Excelsior rule because they
believe it fair and consistent with our democratic traditions.
In a few cases the Board has alluded to the lists to counter union
objections to the content and form of employer communications. I
suggest that such lists be considered prima facie evidence of equal
access to voters and ,therefore grounds for overruling many objections
to employer communications.
The Board has taken other steps to protect access to workers.
When a petition is filed, the employer is requested to post an official,
informational notice. It explains the representation procedure, iden-
tifies the rights of employees under the statute, and lists examples of
employer and union conduct that may result in setting aside the elec-
tion. Although there is no sanction for failure to post, and we have
no data on how many employers post this notice, my impression is
that most employers do post it.
The Board's official notice of election, which must be posted at
least three days before the election by all employers, contains substan-
4 6 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). Professor Bok proposed
this requirement. Bok 99.
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tially the same information as the earlier notice, in addition to various
Items relevant to the balloting. Thus, voters are informed at least
once before the election about their rights to freedom of choice and
a secret ballot.
Although the notices are designed to safeguard the workers' in-
formed and uncoerced choice, the Board has not relied upon posted
notices as irrefutable grounds for overruling either union or employer
objections. The availability of names and addresses, and the notices
posted during the campaign period, assure that the voters are informed
of their rights in NLRB balloting. These simple devices are easy to
administer, and have been accepted by most employers. The Board
is not required to oversee the form and content of campaign com-
munications, and these procedural rules should enable the Board to
focus upon conclusive results. Moreover, if unions and employers
see that the Board has recognized the futility of trying to establish
and enforce substantive rules governing propaganda, they will aid in
the search for new procedural rules.
In some decisions 'the Board has relied upon opportunities for
rebuttal or effective time to reply as the basis for overruling objec-
tions.17 Professor Bok has noted that
as the opportunity to reply is enhanced, the need for regulat-
ing the content of speech tends to diminish. . . . [A]n
adequate opportunity to reply will go far to remove the need
for expanding controls over the content of speech . ..
[T]here are persuasive reasons for concentrating on safe-
guarding these opportunities rather than imposing more
intricate restrictions on the content of speeches and letters.4"
It is unclear from the decisions whether effective time to reply
invariably rebuts otherwise objectionable propaganda or is merely
a "moreover" for a finding that electioneering was unobjectionable.
The lack of clarity tends to give rise to vague and inconsistent rulings,
which baffle the parties and the NLRB staff, and provoke further liti-
gation. A rule regarding effective time to reply should be formulated
4""Section 8(c) does not protect only those views, arguments or opinions that are
correct, nor does it forbid them because they may be demonstrably incorrect. The
remedy is for the union to answer them . . . ." NLRB v. TRW-Semi-Conductors,
Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1967), re,'g 159 N.L.R.B. 415 (1966). See also
General Elec. Co. Specialty Control Dep't, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 1967 CCH NLRB
Dec. g 21,035 (Jan. 16, 1967), enforced, 383 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1967); Elgin Butler
Brick Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1624, 1627 (1964); Ralston Purina Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 506,
509 (1964); American Greetings Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444-45 n.4 (1964) ; The
Holtite Mfg. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 385 (1964); United States Rubber Co., 155 N.L.R.B.
1298 (1955), remanded, 373 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 128,
1968-1 CCH NLRB 1122,161 (Feb. 19, 1968).
48 Bok 91-92.
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in simple terms to provide clear guidance and to facilitate inexpensive
and effective enforcement. The three procedural standards discussed
-adequate opportunity to reply, lists of voter names and addresses,
and informational notices-are easy to understand and administer and
should enable the Board to discontinue its futile attempts to establish
laboratory conditions.4"
If the NLRB, employers, and unions focused upon equal access
to voters and finality of results, the existing substantive rules could
be replaced with suitable procedural ones. After three decades of
disuse, the Board could take advantage of its rulemaking power to
promulgate clear procedural standards."° In addition to the existing
procedural devices, the following seem worthy of consideration:
(1) joint employer-union debates in the plant and at union meetings;
(2) radio and television question-and-answer sessions with a panel of
correspondents; (3) posting of union campaign literature on plant
bulletin boards; and (4) joint employer-union leaflets. Undoubtedly,
the parties and the Board could conceive and accept a wide range of
-effective devices. Unlike the existing regulatory system, such pro-
cedures can achieve their aim because they are self-created, self-
imposed, and self-enforced.
I believe that both unions and employers are sufficiently concerned
about the rising number of objections to accept feasible alternatives,
and to exchange the quest for unattainable ideal standards for equal
access to voters. This conclusion is supported by an observation made
by Professor Bok, before the Board required names and addresses and
adopted the expanded election notice.
[A]lmost all of the organizers interviewed in the course of
this study would trade the strict limitations on employer
speech . . . in return for a more adequate opportunity to
reply.
5
1
Even without any reasonable expectation of providing a basis for over-
ruling union objections based on employer propaganda, employers
have almost unanimously furnished lists and posted notices. I believe
that many employers would implement additional protective procedures
if assured of fewer contested elections.
4
) Another NLRB procedural rule rarely breached by the parties prohibits em-
ployers and unions from making election speeches on company time to assemblies of
employees within 24 hours of an election. A violation of this rule provides a basis
for setting aside the election upon the timely filing of objections. Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).
50 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition
of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1962).
5 1 Bok 91-92 (footnote omitted).
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Since our election system assumes that all citizens are capable of
exercising good judgment in casting their ballots,"2 since experience
demonstrates that the NLRB's complex regulatory system is neither
effective nor necessary, since statistics show more and more disputed
elections, and since the costs of handling inconclusive elections are
rising-the time has arrived for a searching reevaluation of current
NLRB policies. A free election is more than a contest for the voter's
preference; it is the process upon which representative collective bar-
gaining depends. Neither the NLRB nor anyone else can decide what
campaign information is pertinent and what is not. An NLRB election
cannot be antiseptic. No one can say with any assurance what impels
workers to vote one way or another. In every election campaign
unforeseen events and unpredictable influences must be resolved by the
voters in the privacy of the polling booth. The most that can be
expected is that all parties will be able to present facts and arguments,
and that the results will be final.
It is hard to discuss this subject without being misunderstood,
and it is harder still to avoid sounding critical of the Board. I hope
this article raises the right questions, presents a framework for examin-
ing alternatives to deal with the disquieting increase in inconclusive
elections, and suggests ways of avoiding the unstabilizing effect of
unsettled representation questions. Although views regarding the im-
pact of propaganda and the desirability of achieving laboratory con-
ditions are strongly held, I challenge those who believe that if the
Board were to set aside more elections and evolve more stringent
remedies, workers could decide without any improper pressures.
Finally, I propose that the NLRB deliberately refrain from de-
ciding what are acceptable and unacceptable campaign tactics. As an
active administrator, I know that it is easier to talk abstractly about
possible changes than to resolve actual cases by a new method. It is
difficult to theorize about campaign tactics when unions and employers
are urging me to dismiss or sustain objections. Concentration upon
procedural rules and conclusive results is obviously not a magical so-
lution for the complex problem of election objections, particularly
when they have to be applied by the Board and regional staffs in varied
settings. Any solution carries with it gains and losses. We cannot
anticipate all the consequences of new procedures. There will always
2 Confronted with a union bylaw affecting eligibility of members seeking union
offices, the Supreme Court observed: ". . . Congress' model of democratic elections
[within unions] was political elections in this country . . . . [I]n those elections the
assumption is that voters will exercise common sense and judgment in casting their
ballots. Local 6 made no showing that citizens assumed to make discriminating judg-
ments in public elections cannot be relied on to make such judgments when voting as
union members." Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 504 (1968).
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be considerable partisan pressure. But I am convinced that changes
are essential in view of the rising number of objections. My proposal
-hearty and unrestricted electioneering, equal access to the voters,
and conclusive results-is consistent with the representation scheme of
the Act and the NLRB's experience in conducting elections. Whether
or not it is implemented depends on our readiness to evaluate current
methods and explore new ones.
NLRB ELECTIONS
APPENDIX
TABLE I.a
No. of Cases % of % of
Fiscal No. of Involving Objections Determinative
Year Elections Reportsb in Electon4s Challenges Total
1958 4,524 299 6.6 4.4 11.0
1959 5,651 351 6.2 4.3 10.5
1960 6,633 502 7.6 6.0 13.6
1961 6,613 535 8.1 5.6 13.7
1962 7,601 736 9.7 6.0 15.7
1963 7,115 821d 11.2 6.0 17.2
1964 7,559 1,003 11.4 6.6 18.0
1965 7,776 1,027 11.4 5.8 17.2
1966 8,324 1,311 11.6 5.6 17.2
1967 8,183 1,369 13.7 5.7 19.4
TABLE II.
Fiscal % of Employer % of Union
Year Objs. Filed Objs. Filed Both
1960 20.0 80.0
1963 23.6 76.4
1964 24.9 73.9 1.2
1965 25.8 65.1 9.1
1966 27.9 64.0 8.1
1967 29.5 67.1 3.4
TABLE III.
Fiscal No. of Reports on
Year Objections & Challenges % Increase
1965 1,156
1966 1,244 7.6
1967 1,381 11.0
a The statistics are taken from NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, SUmmARY oF OPERATIoNs
1967 and 1968 (six months), and from 23-32 NLRB ANN. REP,. (1958-67). The latter
did not include detailed breakdowns until fiscal year 1964. 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 183-85,
tables 11 A-D (1964).
I am indebted to Martha Dunleavy, Chief of the Organization and Methods Branch
of the NLRB, for explaining and reconciling the election statistics.
b There are discrepancies between the General Counsel's Summaries and the
Annual Reports, since the former are based on written reports issued during the year
for cases which may or may not have been closed, whereas the latter are based on
cases closed during the year.
c These figures understate the percentage of objections and determinative chal-
lenges since they include only objections and challenges for which written reports
were issued. Uncounted are cases where objections were withdrawn, where the parties
agreed to a rerun election without the issuance of a report, or where objections were
filed in rerun and runoff elections. Also uncounted are cases where one party agreed
with the determinative challenge of the other and no report was issued. In fiscal year
1966, 329 objections were withdrawn, and in fiscal year 1967, 342 were withdrawn.
d Note the drop in elections but increase in objections. Not only is there a pro-
gressive increase in the percentage of disputed elections, but also an increase in the
absolute numbers of disputed elections since the higher percentage is on a higher base
of total elections.
